

III Book Reviews

DAVID SHAMBAUGH, *China Goes Global: The Partial Power* (New York: OUP, 2013), pp. 409 + xvi, US\$29.95, ISBN 978-0199361038.

This is a big picture book by a major scholar, the product of five years of research, interviews and writing effort, reflecting the extraordinary access that the author has enjoyed in China, and around the world, as an academic steeped in his specialised knowledge of a country that fascinates the world. The book's key message is captured in the subtitle; Shambaugh elaborates: 'The elements of China's global power are surprisingly weak and uneven' (p. x). The book is not so much about China's rise as its 'spread', viewed in terms of its global footprint.

The structure is straightforward. After a preliminary look at China's global impact, the author examines in turn its global identities, and then goes on to look at China's diplomatic presence across the world on issues ranging from global governance, to economic, cultural and security domains, before his concluding chapter: 'Coping with a Globalized China'. The scholarship marshaled can be measured from the fact that one chapter is supported with 192 endnotes; the range of personalities interviewed is also impressive, and unusually, most are named; the author explains that this should be a new norm in writing about a country that is a global power. Given that China has traditionally 'managed' its relations with foreign scholars by linking their China access with its evaluation of the sympathy shown in their writing, it would be interesting to see if this becomes a new trend. An attractive feature of the book is the wealth of data it offers on subjects that have not received attention, or have been bereft of hard information, as for example the US\$137 million expenditure in 2010 for some 400-odd Confucius centres run by Hanban of the Education Ministry, or that of the 1.39 million Chinese students that went to study abroad between 1978 and 2008, only about 14 per cent returned.

A novel feature in Chapter 2 is a typology that identifies different clusters among Chinese scholars that analyse international affairs and China's role in the world; Shambaugh gives us a spectrum along which opinion is spread, ranging from 'nativist', through shades of realism, to those that prefer to work with major powers (the US, Russia and Europe), all the way to an 'Asia first' school, and finally to those that prefer the Global South, multilateralism and globalism (pp. 26–44). Shambaugh emphasises that these groups tend to

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merge into one another, producing an international identity that is 'contentious and under debate, and is fluid...'. For him the centre of gravity is 'anchored on the Realists, with a strong pull from the Nativists, and weaker influence from the Major Powers and Global South schools' (p. 43). How real are these distinctions? Is there an undercurrent, a 'Party line', or is there genuine divergence of view behind this, representing, for example, the principal power centres of the country? This also begs a question as to the authenticity of such manifestations of Chinese pluralism. Given both the country's opacity and authoritarianism, it seems difficult to get a clear picture of the reality. Shambaugh does not go into this. Professor Kanti Bajpai has worked at a similar typology for Indian international affairs analysts, though this seems to be still a work-in-progress.

Chinese diplomacy is analysed in Chapter 3, which is for me the core of the book. This carries forward the original work of Doak Barnett that was published in 1985 (*The Making of China's Foreign Policy*), and David Lampton followed up on that with his edited classic *The Making of China's Foreign & Security Policy in the Era of Economic Reforms*, 2001. The range of new information as well as insights that Shambaugh offers is impressive. He notes the staging of encounters between Chinese leaders and visiting foreign dignitaries, which embodies elements of ancient court rituals, carried out in a modern context. No capital receives more foreign heads of state and government than Beijing. The CCP's International Affairs Department which used to be the agency for contact with fellow-communist parties, now secularly maintains exchange relationships with 400 political parties around the world, in 140 foreign states. Such outreach to foreign non-state actors is unmatched.

Shambaugh gives the most comprehensive account available of the top levels of the foreign policy decision process, and the manner of operation of the 'Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group' and the 'National Security Leading Small Group', the two vital subsidiaries of the Politburo, and the Foreign Affairs Office of the Central Committee that serves them. He sketches the role played by the Foreign Ministry, whose authority is 'diminished and diluted... It is, however, important not to overstate the MFA's relatively declining role' (p. 66). We should note here the decision of the third plenum of the Central Committee, held in November 2013, to set up a new 'state security committee' reportedly resembling a national security council; attempts in the late 1990s to create such a council had been given up. Clearly, the intent is to coordinate actions of the security agencies, and to tighten Party oversight.

Chapter 6 looks at China's cultural presence in the world, which merits special attention. An Ernst & Young survey of soft power attributes of some 20 emerging states published in 2012 ranks China as the country with the strongest power of attraction, but a sharp contrast to this is provided in one of the epigrams of this chapter, an assertion by Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew to the author that 'China's political system is not attractive... They have little soft power.'

Shambaugh basically supports this latter perspective, noting that despite spending between US\$ 7 to US\$ 10 billion in projecting its culture, it has a 'mixed-to-poor image in public opinion polls', and perceives itself to be under cultural assault from abroad. An Indian scholar attending an academic conference in China recently was asked why India did

not feel threatened by foreign cultural influences, as is the case with China. In net terms, this is a surprising situation for China, considering the huge investments into, and the visible success, of the 2008 Olympics and the 2010 World Expo. Shambaugh argues that for all its effort, China has 'very little influence on global cultural trends' (p. 207). But that begs the question: does it seek to influence world culture, or does it invest to enhance its attractiveness and use culture as a magnet that counters, at least in part, a negative political image? The fact that China gets some 60 million tourists per year, including a vast range of businessmen, and international universities that throng to collaborate with its academia, suggests that this works to a considerable extent, the negatives notwithstanding.

The penultimate chapter looks at China's global security presence, to suggest that while its power projection capability is rising, and it will be more involved with global security at the diplomatic level and on low-cost nontraditional security issues, 'it will remain internally conflicted about the wisdom of deeper involvement in global governance and expanding its global security and military footprint' (p. 273). Against that we see, for instance, a Chinese push towards the Indian Ocean, along a Karakoram pass–Gwadar axis through Pakistan and another set of moves along the Yunnan–Irrawaddy corridor through Myanmar; both these are economic-energy access routes for the present, but one may wonder if this footprint will also gain a military character.

Shambaugh's conclusion is that China pursues a 'limited integration' with the world, as it is 'risk-averse and narrowly self-centered'. What the world should be concerned with is a China that is '...an insecure, confused, frustrated, angry, dissatisfied, selfish, truculent, and lonely power. More than anything else, China wants to be prosperous, secure, respected and left alone in its geo-cultural orbit. This has been the core national mission since the 1870s' (p. 317). This begs the question: if the world is so concerned with the rise of China even at a time when Beijing does not project itself politically on a world canvas, what might be the reaction as and when it drops its reserve and engages globally on a wide canvas? Implicit in Shambaugh's thesis is the notion that for countries that have a sizable engagement with China, the management of that relationship, at bilateral, regional and global levels, will be surely the most complex challenge they may face for many years to come.

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